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The labor share of income varies markedly across the set of democracies. A model
of the political process, situated in a simple macroeconomic environment is analyzed in
which the cause of this variation is linked to dierences in the form of democracy - in
particular the adoption of a presidential or parliamentary system. Presidential regimes
are associated with lower taxation but lower wages. Robust evidence for the negative
impact of a presidential system on the labor share is obtained using a Bayesian Model
Averaging approach. Evidence is also provided that this is due to lower taxation.
We are grateful to seminar participants at Leicester and the 2nd European Workshop in Political
Economy, Dresden. Rockey thanks Jonathan Temple for invaluable guidance and advice. The usual
disclaimer applies. Email: Makris-m.makris@soton.ac.uk, Rockey-jcr12@le.ac.uk1 Introduction
Economic policy in a democracy is driven by the demands of voters and macroeconomic
conditions, which are mediated through the political process. Each archetype of democracy
reconciles these two forces in dierent ways, potentially leading to variation in a range of
societal outcomes. The focus of this paper is to analyze one such outcome: the labor share of
income. This paper considers two broad forms of democracy, Presidential and Parliamentary.
As such it builds on the key work of Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000). By situating
a model of these dierent political processes within a simple macroeconomic framework,
this paper argues that as well being associated with lower levels of taxation (and government
expenditure), presidential democracies should be expected to have, ceteris paribus, a lower
wage level. The second part of the paper provides empirical evidence for this claim. It
employs a Bayesian Model Averaging appproach to identify the causal eect associated
with having a presidential democratic system despite many potential confounding variables.
The evidence obtained using this methodology coincides with the prediction of the model:
the labor share of income is around 12 percentage points lower in presidential democracies.
Dynamic panel data results provide evidence that this variation is due to the mechanism
suggested by the model: variation in the level of taxation.
This paper draws on our emerging understanding of how institutions determine societal
outcomes. Of particular importance is the work of Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000).
They argue that parliamentary democracies lead to greater redistribution, greater rents for
politicians and higher levels of public good provision. A corollary of this is that taxation is
lower in presidential democracies. No survey of their more general contribution is attempted
here, as the model presented in the next section is a simple variation of their model, and
as such provides a more detailed discussion.
Related empirical work includes that of Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson and
Tabellini (2004) who estimate the eect of presidential democracy and nd that it is
associated with a six percentage points smaller government share of GDP.1 Acemoglu (2005)
critiqued the methodology employed, arguing that the majority of the explanatory power
1These estimates are for the early 1990s
1of the instrumental variables used in the rst stage was due to variables unable to predict
dierences in constitutional type.2 This criticism, in part, motivates the use in this paper
of an alternative methodology.
Also important for this paper is the work of Rodrik (1999) who argues that `Democracies
pay higher wages'. In particular his results are that the labor share of income in manufacturing,
conditional on income per capita, is higher in democracies than non-democracies. He suggests
that this may be because the (Nash) bargaining power of workers is greater in a democracy,
due to their greater political and economic freedoms. No argument is advanced in this paper
that such rights vary between types of democracy. The claim is that dierent democratic
systems, and in particular presidential democracies, lead, on average, to dierent policies
given similar societal preferences. As such, this paper builds on Rodrik (1999)'s idea that how
a country is governed can impact upon factor shares. However, the mechanism that drives
dierence between autocracies and democracies is very dierent. This paper shows that the
labor share depends on taxation, which in democracies, depends on the legislative process.
As a rst step, Figure 1 shows the relationship between income per capita and data on
labor's share of value added in manufacturing from the UNIDO (2005) database. Perhaps
most notable is the degree of variation in the labor share, from around 10 percent to about
70 percent. It would also seem on casual inspection that workers in richer democracies
receive a larger share of income. Perhaps more readily apparent is that the labor share
seems higher in parliamentary democracies. This will be conrmed by results obtained
from the Bayesian Model Averaging (henceforth, BMA) analysis presented in section 4.3
Specically, these results suggest that presidential democracies are associated with a labor
share 12 percentage points lower than in equivalent parliamentary regimes.
The hypothesis that variation in the labor share is related to the size of government is moti-
vated, in part, by gure 1. This shows that whilst within the OECD the labor share in presiden-
tial and parliamentary democracies was initially quite similar, over time a sizeable discrepancy
has emerged. As discussed by Boix (2001) and Pickering and Rockey (Forthcoming) the size of
2Rockey (2010) suggests that using an alternative set of instruments, and improved instrumental variable
estimators, a quantitatively similar causal eect to that identied by Persson and Tabellini (2003) may
still be associated with presidential democracy
2Figure 1: Scatterplot of log income per capita and the labor share of value added
government has increased dramatically over the period, in large part due to increases in income
per capita, and this increase is smaller in presidential democracies, as also suggested by Persson
and Tabellini (2003). That the labor share has fallen markedly in OECD presidential democra-
cies, and only slightly in OECD parliamentary democracies, does not conict with this interpre-
tation. It is easy to imagine that some secular trend, such as skill-biased technological change,
has led to a decrease in the labor share, except in parliamentary democracies where this has
been oset by more pronounced growth in the size of government. There is, at most, a small in-
crease in the large dierence between parliamentary and presidential regimes in the full sample.
Both the dierence and the increase are consistent with the model studied in the next section,
where the labor share is increasing in the tax rate, which is itself higher throughout and grows
more in both parliamentary democracies and where labor productivity is greater. Throughout
the period, presidential democracies are poorer throughout the period, start with a lower tax
rate, which grows at a lower rate. According to the model below, these dierence would lead
to such a dierential, and its (small) increase. Moreover, the empirical work suggests that the
dierence in conditional means between parliamentary and presidential democracies remains
large and statistically signicant despite allowing for many possible confounding variables.
3Figure 2: Trends in the average labor Share for Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) address a related
question. They provide evidence that a key determinant of labor market regulation is the
type of legal system; Common law, Napoleonic, etc. Moreover, whilst richer countries have
more generous welfare systems, once legal origin is accounted for, the political power of the
left has little impact on the regulation of labor. Section 4.3 provides evidence that whilst a
legal system based on the Scandanavian system is associated with a greater labor share, this
doesn't reduce the eect of presidential democracy, and other systems have little predictive
power for the labor share of income.
However, the complex way in which the legal and democratic institutional causes of
societal outcomes interact is highlighted by the work of Pagano and Volpin (2005). They
argue that legal origin will have limited predictive power for the extent of investor and
employment protection as in both civil and common law systems reforms of corporate
governance have often been enacted. They employ a model which builds on that of Persson
and Tabellini (1999), and suggest that a majoritarian electoral system tend to enact laws
providing strong investor, and weak employee, protection. However, they do nd that
legal origin retains some additional explanatory power once the form of electoral system
4is controlled for. The model presented here focuses on a dierent aspect of constitutional
variation, the separation of powers.The results presented in Section 4.3 suggest that unlike
the separation of powers, variation in electoral systems has little explanatory power.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 discusses the equilibrium outcomes under dierent forms of democracy, and as such
explains in more detail why the form of constitution might be expected to impact on the labor
share of income. The next two sections describe the empirical analyses. Section 4 outlines
the Bayesian Model Averaging approach used for the cross-sectional data. It also presents
the results and argues they are robust to outliers and the inclusion of other variables. Section
5 provides evidence for the hypothesis that the observed variation in the labor share is due
to dierences in taxation, as suggested by the model. This is followed by a brief conclusion.
2 The Model
Our model is a simple extension of the Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) model (PRT
hereafter) with endogenous labor and wages. Thus, in our case income taxation is distortionary
and aects the remuneration of labor. This dierence between the two models does not change
(conditional on similar parameter restrictions) the predictions oered in PRT regarding
the relationship bewteen political regimes and size of taxes. However, the endogeneity of
labor and wages in our model enables us to establish also a relationship between political
constittions and remuneration of labor - a relationship that will be taken onto the data in
the second part of our paper. Given that the only dierence between our model and that
in PRT is the endogeneity of labor and wages, the description of the model will be brief.
For more details, the interested readers could consult PRT.
Time periods are indexed by t = 1;2;:::;1 There are 3 identical regions, indexed by
j = 1;2;3; each with a representative citizen. There is a perfectly traded single good and
an economy-wide public good gt  0 that has a per-unit cost, in terms of the single good,
which is common knowledge and normalized to one.
Policies are chosen by an elected decision-making body, which consists of a representative
from each region, according to the constitutional rules in place. These rules will be outlined
5shortly. Elections for the representatives take place at the end of each period, right after that
period's output is determined and policy is implemented but before next period's economic
activities commence. Assume partial policy commitment: elected policy-makers can commit
only for the policies of next period (i.e. for when they are in oce) but they can credibly
announce once they are elected, i.e. at the beginning of next period.
Fiscal revenues are raised by means of an income tax rate t across all regions. Denoting
region-j citizen's income with y
j





per-unit cost of public good is non-contractible. This enables the policy-makers to appropriate
scal resources in the form of rents (claiming a higher per-unit cost). Denote total political
rents with st  0 and s
j
t  0 the political rents appropriated by the representative of region
j: Fiscal revenues nance the public good, political rents and region-specic (per-capita)
transfers, r
j
t  0: We turn to the political environment.
2.1 The Political Environment
In each region there are two exogenously given and identical politicians who compete for oce.
Thus, one of these politicians is the incumbent representative and the other is the challenger.
Majority voting determines the region's representative from these two politicians. Voting
for the election of the representative takes place according to a retrospective voting rule
(for a discussion of retrospective voting, see, for instance, PRT). Thus, voters condition their
vote on the past performance of their representative. The winner of the election in region
j derives a benet of W
j
t : This simply denotes the continuation payo from being elected for
period-t + 1 oce in the equilibria of the game. Let  be the common discounting factor of









t is the probability of being re-elected for oce in period t + 1.
The timing of events is the following. Fix any period t: Given period-t economic
decisions and policies, we have that the period t net income y
j
t(1   t) of citizens is
determined. Immediately after, at the end of period-t; majority-voting elections take place
simultaneously and independently in every region to elect/choose their representatives.
Elected representatives comprise the decision-making body - the legislature. Then, agenda-
6setters are chosen from the set of regional representatives according to the constitutional rules,
outlined in the next paragraph. Given the identity of agenda-setters, voters in each region j
set simultaneously and independently their cuto voting rules to be used in the forthcoming
elections. These rules are of the form:3 \if political agreement over a policy with non-zero
spending takes place and attained welfare is at least equal to $
j
t then vote for the incumbent
representative of my region (j); otherwise vote for the challenger". Given the performance
standards of voters, f$1
t;$2
t;$3






j=1, according to the constitutional rules. Given the period-t net income
and rationally anticipated period-t+1 policies and prices, period-t+1 private consumption and
production decisions take place; markets clear and prices are determined. Subsequently, period-
t + 1 policies are implemented and period-t + 1 net incomes are thus determined, and so on.
The three political constitutions, for the determination of policies, we investigate are the
simple-legislature, the presidential system and the parliamentary system. For a discussion on
the modeling of these constitutions see PRT. Following PRT, under the simple-legislature
system, there is only one agenda-setter who proposes all policies. Representatives vote
this proposal against the status-quo policy. If the agenda-setter secures a majority then the
proposal becomes an actual policy; otherwise the status-quo policy is set:  =  ; g = rj = 0;
for any j; and total scal revenues are uniformly shared between representatives: Under the
presidential system, there is separation of powers. Specically, there is one agenda-setter
responsible for the budget who chooses the tax, and one agenda-setter responsible for
the spending allocation who chooses regional transfers/rents and the level of public good.
Agenda-setting is as follows. First, the tax-setter proposes a tax. If she secures a majority,
the proposal becomes the actual tax-policy; otherwise the status-quo tax is set,  =  : Given
the tax set at the budget-setting stage, the spending-setter proposes the allocation of the
budget into regional transfers and public good and the sharing of political rents between
representatives. If she secures a majority, the proposal becomes the actual spending-policy;
otherwise the status-quo spending-policy is set, g = rj = 0; for any j; and total scal revenues
are uniformly shared between representatives: Under the parliamentary constitution,
3 This rule is consistent with the one investigated in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 1998) and
Persson and Tabellini (2000).
7there is governmental discipline/cohesion. In more detail, now, there are two ministers
(government partners). The senior partner (the prime minister) proposes a public nance
policy. Next, the junior member of the government can veto the proposal. If there is no veto,
then the proposal becomes actual policy (it is supported by the two ministers). If there is a
veto then the government breaks down. When the government breaks down, the legislature
becomes a \caretaking" simple-legislature. In this case, the outcome is the equilibrium
outcome of a simple-legislature.4 Moreover, in any case agenda-setters are randomly chosen.
Finally, if a policy-setter is indierent between the other two legislators, we assume that
these legislators have the same probability of being included in the winning coalition.
Up to now the model follows that in PRT, where income is exogenously given (and equal
to 1). In our case, however, it is endogenous. The economic environment is thus important
for our purposes.
2.2 The Economic Environment





t, having per-period preferences5
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t is the real wage rate and 
j
t are the real prots of the region's rm. She chooses
optimal consumption and labor supplies to maximize her intertemporal expected discounted
utility taking as given current and future prices and prots, and current and future policies.
4This version of Parliamentary system is according to Persson and Tabellini (2000). Results would
not change if, as in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1998), (a) nature only draws the spending-setter who,
in turn, chooses the tax-setter, (b) the tax proposal is made before the spending proposal, and (c) either
of the partners can veto the policy.
5Note that we will be using square brackets for functions and brackets for collected terms.
8She also takes into account that future consumption and labor decisions will be taken
optimally. It follows that consumers' optimal labor supply in every period t is given by
l
j




where v0 1 denotes the inverse of v0: Clearly, labor supply is increasing in the wage and
decreasing the tax, if v0 1[w
j
t(1   )]  1.
Assume that public good preferences are such that H[0] = 0;H0 > 0;H00 < 0 and
H0[0] > 1: The latter ensures that the Utilitarian level of public good is positive. Let
H0 1[1
3]  ^ g be the Samuelson-rule level of public good.
In each region, there is also an identical production technology represented by q[l
j
t];
q0 > 0;q00 < 0; q[0] = 0; where  is a technology parameter: Assume the Inada conditions that


















Clearly, then, labor decisions and wages will be the same across regions, due to the assump-
tion that regions are identical. Moreover, observe that liml!0 q0[l] = 1 and lim!0 v0[] = 1,
in conjunction with consumer's optimal labor supply and the remuneration of labor, imply that
in equilibrium labor must be positive. Therefore, dropping the superscript j hereafter when-
ever there is no risk of confusion, we have that the wage and labor supply in each and every





Let also w[t;]  q0[L[t;]] and note that 1   v0 1[w[t;](1   t)] = L[t;]:
9It follows directly that a higher income tax increaseses the real wage: in
fact, we have @L[t;]=@t =
w[t;]
u00[L[t;]]+q00[L[t;]](1 t) < 0 and hence @w[t;]=@t =
q00[L[t;]]f@L[t;]=@tg > 0). Note also that @L[t;]=@ =  
(1 t)w[t;]
u00[L[t;]]+q00[L[t;]](1 t) > 0:
Private income before tax in any region, yt, equals the region's output: wtlt + t = q[lt].
It follows that the equilibrium scal revenues are
3tq[L[t;]]  R[t;]:
Accordingly,







be the private income expressed as a function of the tax rate and productivity. Given
@L[t;]=@t < 0; we thus have that an increase in the tax reduces the tax base (i.e. income
y[t;t]). Note also that
(@R[t;]=@t)=3 = y[t;] + tw[t;](@L[t;]=@t);
which is independent of past outcomes. Furthermore, after some straightforward
dierentiation, we have @R[t;]=@ = 3t(@y[t;]=@) > 0.
Assume that @2R[t;]=@2
t < 0 and lim!1 @R[;]=@t < 0: Noting that y[0;] > 0
and hence @R[0;]=@t > 0; we therefore have that total revenues have a unique maximum
for any given . Denote ^ s[] > 0 this maximal tax revenues and ^ [] > 0 the corresponding
(revenue maximizing) tax rate (in PRT these were exogenously given to be equal to 3 and 1,
respectively). Let now  s[]  R[ ;] and, echoing similar assumption in PRT, focus on the
case where  s[] < ^ s[] for any : We will often refer to ^ s[] as maximum possible rents and to
^ [] as revenue-maximizing or Leviathan tax. In our setup, policy-makers would never choose
a tax higher than the Leviathan tax as this would lead to lower public good and/or transfers
(and hence lower welfare of voters) and/or political rents than the revenue-maximizing tax. We
10therefore assume hereafter, without loss of generality, that admissible taxes are  2 [0; ^ []] for
given : Clearly, for any such tax we have that total tax revenues are increasing in the tax.
We nish this section with the consumers' per-period value functions. Let
V [t;]  y[t;](1   t) + v[1   L[t;]]:
The per-period value function of the citizen in the typical region is then given by
V [t;] + r
j
t + H[gt]:
Note, after using the envelope theorem, that:
@V [t;]=@t =  y[t;];
which is independent of past outcomes and negative. Let us focus hereafter on the
case where, V [;] + H[R[;]   T] is strictly concave with respect to  for any   0 and












@ are6 strictly decreasing with





This ensures that the Utilitarian tax is positive.7
To complete the model, it remains to dene the type of equilibria that we characterize
in Section 3.
6For the second one needs to set T = R[;]   H0 1[1] and for the third T = R[;]   H0 1[1
2]:
7At an interior solution, the Utilitarian optimum is given by zero, as expected, political rents, zero






We focus on sequentially rational equilibria in symmetric (pure) Markov policy-strategies.8
Markov strategies imply that actions in any given period depend on past history only through
the `state'. The `state' is a (possibly multi-dimensional) variable which summarizes the
inuence of past interactions on the current strategic environment. In other words, the
state is the minimal information in the history of a game which is relevant for the strategic
interaction between players. In our context, the past has no direct eect on the actions of
consumers, legislators and voters; that is, the state is empty. Bearing this in mind, in a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the model here, period-t policy decisions are optimal
from each and every legislator's point of view given the constitutional rules of political
interaction and voting performance standards, while the latter are a Nash equilibrium given
the constitution and the rationally anticipated equilibrium period t policy decisions. In
any period, legislators and voters take into account the eects of their actions in the yet
to be determined competitive equilibria. In any period-t; consumers and rms make optimal
decisions taking as given prices, prots and policies over time.
Given that policy-makers face the same environment in any given period in oce, we
focus on stationary equilibria. Accordingly, we drop the time-superscript t hereafter to
lighten the notation. Moreover, we drop, until further notice, the dependence on productivity
 of the various endogenous variables.
We turn to the characterization of equilibria and how these depend on the constitutional
rules. As in PRT, we restrict attention to the case where  s=3  W and assume that the
status quo-policy is inecient in that, in equilibrium, voters prefer the equilibrium policy
instead of the status quo-policy. Moreover, we will restrict attention to the case of suciently
low discount factor; in particular, we restrict parameters so that (in equilibrium) ^ s > 6W:
8It is well-known that in dynamic non-cooperative games multiplicity of equilibria arises. For a discussion
of the advantages of Markov strategies in dynamic games see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch13) Our focus
on symmetric equilibria is driven by the fact that regions are ex ante identical.
123 Equilibrium
That citizens and politicians are assumed to be identical implies that the problem of how
rst-period representatives are selected is orthogonal to our analysis, and hence skipped.
Given the stationarity of equilibria, we can thus focus on the strategic interactions within
some arbitrary period from the point where the legislature is formed until the stage when
policy is chosen (and credibly announced).
Importantly, the structure of our model is isomorphic to PRT with ^  here being the
counterpart of the maximum tax (set to 1) there. Namely, for any  < ^ ; a marginal increase
in the tax lowers, all other things equal, voters' utility (by y utils here and by 1 util in PRT)
and raises total scal revenues (by 3(q + q0 @L
@ ) units here and 3 units in PRT). It follows
directly that the fundamental properties of the equilibrium characterized in PRT (for the
parameter restrictions mentioned above) carry through unchanged in our set up. These
properties are well-known and understood by now and, hence, their duscussion will be brief
here.9 Moreover, anticipating our empirical work we focus only on the discussion of policies
in the Parliamentary and Presidential systems.
Under all systems the region which is not included in the (minimum winning) policy-
making coalition does not receive any transfer and its representative does not receive any
political rents. The reason is that this region's political support is not needed and transfers
and political rents channeled to this region would leave the coalition with less resources
to satisfy their voters and appropriate as political rents. Under the Presidential system,
competition between voters for their regions to be included in the winning coalition formed
by the spending-setter leads to zero transfers to all regions but the one of the spending-setter.
Because under the Parliamentary system the policy-making coalition is predetermined, such
competition does not take place. Moreover, because voters set their performance standards
independently and simultaneously, there is a continuum of equilibria in terms of the division
of total equilibrium transfers between the regions whose representatives form the government.
In the Parliamentary system, we also have the following. First, to ensure that they do not
receive the lowest possible welfare and that they do not leave excessive rents to politicians,
9The details of equilibrium characterization are as in PRT and available upon request.
13voters must leave the agenda-setting winning coalition indierent between agreeing on the
`Leviathan' policy of maximizing revenues and providing zero public good and regional
transfers (attaining a joint payo of ^ s). And agreeing on a policy that ensures their re-election
(attaining a joint payo s + 2W). Thus, in equilibrium, s = ^ s   2W. From these rents,
the spending-setter will give just enough rents to his partner-legislator (and keep the rest for
himself) to gain the latter's support for his proposal. Second, the equilibrium policy must
be jointly optimal for the voters represented in the policy-setting coalition, conditional on
satisfying the constraint that s  ^ s  2W: This follows from the fact that here voters in the
region of the junior-partner are not threatened to be excluded from the governing coalition
as long as the latter attains enough political rents. Therefore, voters in the jurisdictions
whose representatives are in the government maximize, in eect, through their choice of
their performance standards their total utility 2(V [] + H[g] + r) subject to s = ^ s   2W
and s + r + g = R[]; where r denotes total regional transfers: This ensures that they attain
the maximum possible payo conditional on the government not breaking down and being
re-elected and the scal resource constraint is satised.
Under the Presidential constitution, spending-setting is constrained by the tax-outcome
in the tax-setting stage. We thus have that voters must ensure at the lowest cost for them
that the agenda-setting winning coalition is (weakly) worse o by agreeing on providing zero
public good and regional transfers (attaining a joint payo of R[]) instead of agreeing on a
policy that ensures their re-election (attaining a joint payo s + 2W). Thus, in equilibrium,
s = maxf0;R[]   2Wg: From these rents, the spending-setter will give just enough rents
to the partner-legislator to gain the latter's support for his proposal. In addition, at the
tax-setting stage, all legislators are residual claimants in expected terms. This implies that
in equilibrium (where legislators are reelected), the tax-setter proposes a tax that ensures
revenues such that maxf0;R[]   3Wg  ^ s   6W: Any lower revenues would imply that
he has an incentive to deviate by oering the maximum admissible tax.10 Let C denote the
10To see this, note rst that, in equilibrium, the tax-setter will be included in the spending-setter's
coalition with probability 1/2. Hence, his expected payo is 1
2(maxf0; 1
3R[]   Wg) + W: In equilibrium,
it must be that the former is at least as high as the expected payo from deviating to a tax 0 dierent
than : If this payo is 1
2
^ s
3; this implies the inequality in the main text. The latter payo corresponds
to a deviation of 0 = ^  and the spending-setter proposing the full expropriation policy with the tax-setter
being the partner with probability 1/2. The fact that 0 = ^  is the best deviation for the tax-setter follows
14minimum admissible tax that satises this inequality. Following the corresponding arguments
in PRT, one can see, due to   < ^  and legislators being residual claimants (in expected
terms) that in equilibrium  = C = R 1[^ s   3W]; where R 1 is the inverse if R. Finally,
voters in the spending-setting jurisdiction maximize, in eect, through their choice of the
performance standard, their utility V [] + H[g] + r subject to s = maxf0;R[]   2Wg and
s+r +g = R[] taking as given the tax  = C: This ensures that they attain the maximum
possible payo conditional on the minimum winning coalition being re-elected and the scal
resource constraint is satised given the tax determined in the tax-setting stage.
We can now turn to the characterization of equilibrium policy.
3.1 The Parliamentary System
Denote the policy under the Parliamentary system with the superscript P: We thus have
that rents are given by:
s
P = ^ s   2W
P:
From the above, the tax, the level of public good and total transfers to the governing




2H[R[]   r   s
P] + 2V [] + r:
Note that R[] sP  r  0 and ^ s > 6W P (by assumption) implies that R[P]  sP > 0
and hence P > 0: Let ~ P be the solution of 2V 0[]+R0[] = 0: Note that ~ P < ^ : It turns out
that we can ignore the constraints  2 [0; ^ ]. These are satised by the solution to the relaxed
problem. We then have (after a trivial inspection of the rst order conditions with respect
to  and r of the relaxed problem11) that the solution of the above problem is such that:
from an argument which is identical to the corresponding one in PRT, after noting that V [] is decreasing
and R[]   maxf0; 1
3R[]   Wg is increasing in .
11Note that if R[]   r = sP then the rst order condition with respect to r and our assumption that
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P]   s
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3.2 The Presidential System Policies




 1[^ s   3W
C]
Turning to spending policy for given tax equal to C, given that R[C] = ^ s 3W C > 2W C
(by assumption); we have that
s
C = ^ s   5W
C




C]   r   s
C] + r:
Due to our assumption that H0[0] > 1; we can ignore the constraint R[C]   sC  r (it is
satised by the solution of the relaxed problem): In fact, after a trivial inspection of the












To compare the taxes of the Parliamentary and Presidential systems we need to characterize





given that every legislator has 1/3 chance to be the spending-setter and 1/3 chance of being
in the spending-setting coalition. Recall also that sP = ^ s   2W P; while sC = ^ s   5W C:











Clearly, W C < W P: Note also that ^ s > 6W P and ^ s > 6W C if  < 3=7: Thus, restricting
attention to the case of  < 3=7 (to be consistent with the case we focus on of ^ s > 6W
under any political system) we have that ^ s   3W C < ^ s   2W L:
We turn to the comparison of taxes between the parliamentary and the presidential
systems.12 Clearly, we have from the above that R[P]  sP: Therefore, P  R 1[^ s 2W P]
12From ^ s 5WC < ^ s 2Wp we also have that political rents are lower under the presidential system. The
reason is, as in PRT, that the spending-setter in this system does not have tax-setting powers as well. Recall
also that under the presidential system we have gC = minfH0 1[1];R[C]   sCg = minfH0 1[1];2WCg;
while under the parliamentary system we have gP = minfH0 1[1
2];R[P] sPg: Note that H0 1[1
2] > H0 1[1]:
Moreover, note that R[C] sC = 2WC = 2 ^ s
3+2and R[P] sP = R[P]  ^ s+2WP = R[p] 3
^ s(1 )
3  .
Using these observations, one can very easily see that if 2 ^ s
3+2 < R[p]   3
^ s(1 )
3  then gC < gP as in
PRT. Similarly, if 2 ^ s
3+2  R[p]   3
^ s(1 )
3  and H0 1[1] < R[p]   3
^ s(1 )
3  : However, in the remaining
case, we have, in contrast to PRT, that gP  gC : in this case the tax distortions are high enough to make
public good provision lower under the Parliamentary system. Note that this case is relevant if, for instance,
H0 1[1
2] > R[~ P]   sP and V 0[R 1[sP]] + H0[0]R0[R 1[sP]]  0, in which case we have (after recalling
the characterization of Parliamentary policy) that R[p] = sP = 3
^ s(1 )
3  (note also that the latter inequality
17> R 1[^ s   3W C] = C: Thus, as in PRT, the presidential system raises less taxes than
the parliamentary system. The reason is similar: the distortions in the tax-setting are
suciently low to not deter the agenda-setter of a simple legislator from setting a very high
tax, and voters in the tax-setting jurisdiction under a presidential system prefer the lowest
possible tax consistent with equilibrium as they receive no transfers.
Anticipating the empirical part of our paper, we summarize the key empirical predictions
of the model. Recall, that an increase in the tax-rate leads to an increase in the labor share,
all other things equal. Note here that, for any given tax, the equilibrium wage depends
on the productivity level. This eect however cannot be signed (due to q0 > 0; q00 < 0
and @L[t;]=@ > 0) without imposing further restrictions on the fundamentals of the
model. Note also that, for any given tax, the equilibrium income per capita is increasing
in productivity (due to q > 0; q0 > 0 and @L[t;]=@ > 0). This implies, in turn, that total
revenues are also increasing in productivity for any given tax. Taking into account that optimal
taxes depend also on productivity, complicates the relationships in question, as discussed
above. Specically, to sign them also requires further parameter restrictions. Using the labor
share (which in terms of our model is q0L=q) as a proxy for wages, our data analysis shows that
we should expect wages to be positively related with productivity (ie. that the direct eect of
productivity - that is, for given labor - might dominate in reality). Moreover, private income
per capita and the size of the government as measured by revenues per GDP, which in terms of
our model is the income tax rate (note that R=3y = ), are positively related to productivity.
The key prediction of the model is that Parliamentary systems other things equal will
have higher wages solely due to the political system. Of course, wages will also be inuenced
over time by changes in productivity, with the net eect depending on the strength of the
eect of the latter on taxes (for given political system). The rst of the next two sections
provide evidence of the eect of Parliamentary systems, and the second that this eect is
due to variation in the tax level.
cannot be satised in PRT where taxation is lump-sum taxation because in that case we have V 0 =  R0):
Nevertheless, distinguishing (pure) public good provision from redistribution in the data is very hard and
therefore we do not pursue this issue further in what follows.
184 Cross-Sectional Estimates
4.1 Methodology
This section will provide a brief overview of the rst econometric approach employed, and
how it provides for causal inference. Isolating the eects of constitutions from other potential
determinants of the labor share is intrinsically complicated by the interactions between market
and state. The approach taken is to conceive of the choice of constitution as a treatment, and
to estimate the eect of that treatment. However, consistent estimation requires that the
choice of constitution must be independent of any other factor determining the labor share.
Accordingly, we rst outline what is meant here by a causal eect of presidential democracy
and the conditions necessary to estimate it consistently. We then use consider how BMA
can be used to maximize the chances of satisfying these conditions, given the available data.
Formally, let YC; YP be the outcomes associated with a congressional/presidential system
or a parliamentary constitution respectively. X is the set of variables which may partially
determine the choice of constitution, and S 2 f0;1g is the choice of constitution, with S = 1
denoting a presidential system. It is unlikely that S is independent of YC;YP i.e:
(1) S ? YC;YP
But it is potentially true that conditional on X, S is independent of YC;YP:
(2) S ? (YC;YP) j X
As is standard, the relationship between the outcomes Y and the treatment S can be written
as follows:
(3) Y = (1   S)YC + SYP = YC + S(YP   YC)
If estimates of (3) using OLS are to be unbiased then (2) must hold and as such it is
19necessary to include the confounding variables X, whilst YP is subsumed into the constant
term which is denoted : Then by including a binary variable, S, to denote whether or not
a particular country has received the treatment (in this case a presidential constitution)
the associated coecient  is an estimate of the treatment eect. Such an OLS model can
be written as follows:
(4) Y =  + S + X + "
such that:
(5) E(") = E("S) = E("X) = E(" j S) = 0
For estimation to be consistent both (2) and (5) must be true. This requires that there are
no relevant variables missing from X, and that those variables included are uncorrelated
with the error term, i.e. exogenous.
The reasons why dierent nations have chosen dierent constitutional rules are complex
and varied. As discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Acemoglu (2005) intellectual
fashion and also potential colonial inuence have been of particular importance. But there
are many other, potentially complimentary, possible explanations and the number of variables
required to describe these is large. The small sample available prohibits including them
all in a regression analysis and hence leads to concerns about model uncertainty since it
is not known a priori what are the constituents of X.13 Many traditional econometric
approaches to this problem, such as stepwise regression, suer from path-dependence, that
is they are sensitive to the order in which variables are included. Moreover identifying the
constituents of X via any attempt to test down to a parsimonious specication from a large
set of variables will lead to the inferential problems associated with data-mining as detailed
by Miller (2002, Ch.6). In contrast, a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach may
be preferable since it will provide an estimate of the likelihood of dierent choices of X
13Whilst our model describes the relationship between taxation, government size, and the labor share,
it does not make any predictions as to which form of democracy a country will adopt.
20and also a posterior distribution for  obtained from each of the dierent possible models
weighted by their respective posterior model probabilities.
The remainder of this section will provide a brief overview of BMA which is described
in more detail in Hoeting, Raftery, Madigan and Volinsky (1999) and Malik and Temple
(2009). BMA is premised on the basis that since there are sometimes multiple, similarly
likely, statistical models which imply dierent inferences, it is sometimes helpful to consider
a wide range of possible models, and the overall likelihood of a variable being important.14
A BMA analysis starts with a set of prior beliefs about which models are expected to be
more likely, and prior beliefs about the distribution of the coecients on particular variables.
For example, if one had a strong theoretical justication for believing, or previous results
suggested, that a certain variable was likely to be statistically important then models which
included that variable could be given a higher prior probability. Similarly, if it was believed
that this variable was very likely to be negatively associated with the dependent variable
then its prior distribution could be chosen such that the majority of the probability mass
was where the coecient was negative. In the analysis here, few assumptions are made as to
the prior distribution. Instead a \diuse" prior is used: in particular it is assumed that every
possible model has an equal prior probability, that is if there are 225 possible models then each
model has a prior probability of 1
225: This assumption implies that every variable, including
the treatment, is assumed to have an equal chance of 0:5 of inclusion in any given model.
The prior distributions of the coecients associated with each variable are chosen to have
zero mean, and variance proportional to the sample variance of the explanatory variable.
Given these choices, the posterior model distribution (the probability of each model given
the data) is calculated. Following Hoeting, Raftery, Madigan and Volinsky (1999) let  be
the quantity of interest, such as the eect of a presidential constitution, and D the dataset.
There are N = 2K possible models Mi where K is the number of explanatory variables.
The posterior distribution of  is given by:
14The motivation for this approach is slightly dierent to that used in the Growth Determinants literature
(c.f. Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004)) where the focus is often on identifying which variables
explain variation in Y . Here, as discussed, the focus is on ensuring consistent estimation of .
21(6) pr( j D) =
N X
i=1
pr( j Mi;D)pr(Mi j D)
where the posterior probability of any given model, Mi is:






(8) pr(D j Mi) =
Z
pr(D j i;Mi)pr(i j Mi)di
The vector i represents the parameters for model i, i.e. i = fi;i1;:::;iK;ig. Where
i = ^ "0^ "
T k denotes the error variance of model i, where T is the number of observations
and k is the number of variables in model i. The exact interpretation of (6), (7), and (8)
are discussed more thoroughly in Kass and Raftery (1995), Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting
(1997), and Hoeting, Raftery, Madigan and Volinsky (1999). In essence (8) describes the
chance of observing the data if that particular model was the model believed before the data
were observed. The posterior probability of a particular model given by (7) describes the
probability of that model once the data have been observed and (6) describes the calculation
of the conditional distribution of , given the data D that is the probability of  taking a
given value for each model multiplied by the posterior probability of that model.
Once the posterior model probability (PMP) of each model has been calculated, several
related quantities can be obtained. The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) is the sum
of the PMPs of those models which include that variable (i.e. those in which its coecient
is non-zero). Also, the posterior mean and standard deviation of a given variable can be
calculated by computing the weighted average of the mean or standard deviation across
22all models weighted by the PMPs.
4.2 Data
This section will discuss the data used to measure the labor share, the type of democracy,
and the set of candidate control variables. Following Rodrik (1999) the labor share in value
added in manufacturing is used as the measure of the labor share. And similarly the data
are taken from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database. The labor share was calculated
as average labor costs divided by the mean value added per worker, and a ve year average






The only dierence with Rodrik's approach is that the data were calculated for each
year in the period 1990-94; this period represented the years for which there was greatest
data availability and corresponds to the data used by Persson and Tabellini which is also
for the early 1990s.15 There has been some criticism of the use of factor-share data. In
particular, Gollin (2002) claims that previous work using data on factor shares overstates
the variation between countries, as a consequence of failing to take into account the income
of entrepreneurs and more generally the self-employed. However, these criticisms seem less
applicable to manufacturing industry data which is used for this reason and because it is
available for a large set of democracies. Moreover, we are unaware of any alternative measure
that represents comparable quantities across countries and time. One advantage of using
the labor share is that since it is constructed as a ratio it alleviates potential concerns about
inadequate adjustments for ination or exchange rate movements.
Persson and Tabellini (2003) dene six variables that describe dierent aspects of
constitutional type. These variables all measure aspects of the dierences between
parliamentary and presidential democracies. The rst, pres, is a dummy variable which
takes a value of one if the executive is not accountable to the legislature via no-condence
15Further details, and the data used are available on request.
23votes. This measure corresponds to the distinction between congressional and parliamentary
regimes discussed by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997), and the model presented above
in Section 2. This variable will be used to measure the `treatment' associated with adopting
a presidential democracy. In order to establish that it is indeed a presidential system that is
the key source of variation rather than a more general majoritarian consensual dichotomy
ve other measures of constitutional form, describing electoral systems, proposed by Persson
and Tabellini (2003) were used in a principal components analysis to create a single measure
of other dierences in electoral system. The principal components were created using Persson
and Tabellini's variables Pind, Magn, Sdm, Spropn, and maj.16 The ve principal components
will be denoted by g1, g2, ... , g5 . An analysis of the loadings of the principal components
suggests that indeed the rst component broadly measures countries on a First-Past-The-Post
to Proportional-Representation spectrum.17
The predictions of the theoretical analysis are that the labour share will be higher in
parliamentary democracies than presidential democracies, conditional on the productivity
level (). As a measure of , we use loga, the logarithm of Total Factor Productivity
(TFP). TFP is not necessarily predetermined and maybe partly determined by the choice of
constitution and the pre-treatment control variables that generate constitutional selection.18
If constitutional choice partly determines productivity and this has an eect on the labor
share, then there will be an indirect eect of constitutional choice on the labor share due to its
eects on income levels. In this case, to maintain the assumption that the coecients on the
constitutional variables identify a causal treatment eect it is required that logais independent
16Pind describes the proportion of the legislature not elected on the basis of party lists. In bicameral
democracies it refers to elections to the lower house. Magn is the \inverse of district magnitude", the
number of electoral districts per seat in the lower chamber. Sdm is analogous to magn, but where there
are electoral districts of dierent sizes it calculates the inverse of district magnitude as the weighted average
of the dierent district sizes, where the weighting for each district size is the percentage of seats in the
legislature elected from districts of that size. Spropn describes the proportion of electoral seats elected
from national electoral districts rather than sub-national districts. In this respect it captures something
akin to pind. The nal variable is maj which takes a value of one if elections to the lower-house of the
legislature are by plurality (rst-past-the-post) rule, or zero otherwise.
17The rst principal component explains 70% of the total variance and positively weights all of the
constitutional variables except spropn which has a very small negative value. The second principal
component acounts for a further 20% of the variance and places most weight on spropn.
18Persson and Tabellini (2004, ch7) provide evidence that Presidential regimes are associated with lower
productivity (and income per capita) and that this eect is due to government policy less supportive of
productive activity.
24of the error term conditional on X (the predetermined controls), that is, loga ? " j X.
Following Lee (2005, Ch.2) then the inclusion of loga as a candidate independent variable will
mean that the indirect eects on the labor share of constitutional choice through loga will
be partialled out. Therefore, the coecients associated with the treatment (constitutional
choice) will describe solely the direct eects of the treatment, which is the quantity of interest.
It might be expected that impact of both democracy in general and its type would vary
with the quality of government. Furthermore, the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)
and Dulleck and Frijters (2004) suggests that part of this variation may be due to reasons not
captured by our existing control variables. In particular, resource wealth may, other things
being equal, lead to lower quality government. However, including a measure of the degree of
democracy, PolityIV in X suggested it had little predictive power.19 But, it is not plausible
to make the same assumption about the conditional exogeneity of polityiv as it is for loga.
Therefore a plausibly exogenous proxy variable, or instrument, is needed. The instrumental
variable partitioned is from the data created by Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2006) in
which they investigate the extent to which states are often \articial", created by previous
colonialists rather than representing underlying ethnic groups. Partitioned describes the
proportion of a state's population who are members of an ethnic group which is present
in one or more adjacent countries. They nd that partitioned is correlated with measures
of good governance. Using both OLS and BMA analysis, partitioned is found to be a good
predictor of polityiv and is considered plausibly exogenous. However, results not reported
in the interests of brevity suggest that our conclusions are quantitatively and qualitatively
unaected by the inclusion of either variable, and the dierent sample sizes this entails.
The other candidate control variables are largely from Persson and Tabellini (2003).
engfrac describes the proportion of the population speaking English as a rst language, eurfrac
is the same but for the major European languages English, French, German, Portuguese, or
Spanish. engfrac and eurfrac are included based upon the work of Hall and Jones (1999) and,
to a lesser extent, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). ilat01 measures absolute distance
from the equator. A variety of age measures were employed, age is Persson and Tabellini
19The Polity IV project codes regimes from 10 - fully institutionalized democracy to -10 - fully
institutionalized autocracy.
25(2003)'s measure. Also included are the variables, proposed by Rockey (2010): mthconstit
and mthelect which are new measures of when a country rst promulgated a democratic
constitution, and when it held its rst democratic election respectively. These variables
are argued to represent a useful alternative to age. The variables con2150,con5180,con81
are indicator variables which describe whether the current constitution was promulgated
between 1921 and 1950, 1951-1980 or post-1981 with 1920 or earlier the omitted category.
The inclusion of these variables is designed to represent the well-documented notion of
dierent waves of democratization. These waves coincided with systematic variations in
what constitutions were chosen, as discussed in more detail in Persson and Tabellini (2003)
and Rockey (2010). Finally indicator variables are included for whether a country has a
federal government (federal) or was colonized by the UK, Spain, or another European nation
discounted by time since independence (coluka, colespa, colotha) and nally which continent it
is part of (africa, asiae, laam). Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1.
4.3 Results
This section comprises four parts. Firstly, it will discuss the results and implications of
the benchmark specication presented in Table 2. Then it will discuss the implications
of the relative lack of predictive power of the legal origin variables developed by Botero
et al. (2004) as shown in Table 3. It will argue for the robustness of these results using a
Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MC3) estimation approach that simultaneously performs BMA
and the identication of outliers, the results of which are presented in Table 4. Related OLS
estimates of all these analyses are contained in 5.
The results in Table 2 show that pres has a PIP of 99:9%. This implies that pres is
included in almost every likely model. The posterior mean associated with pres is  0:12
which implies that workers in countries with a presidential system receive a share of value
added 12 percentage points less than their counterparts in parliamentary democracies. This
is especially striking given the small range of values of mean9094 which has a standard
deviation of only 0:14. However, none of the other constitutional variables had high PIPs.20
20g5 is excluded from the analysis as whilst it had an intermediate PIP, this was judged to be a statistical
artefact given the negligible PIP of the rst four principal components.
26Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that the relevant dimension of variation
that is important is the presence (or not) of a presidential system.
Table 2 also strongly suggests, in line with the predictions of the model, that more
productive nations pay their workers a greater share of output. The predicted share of trade
in national income (frankrom) also has a PIPs of over 90%. That countries likely to trade
more than average have a higher labor share is perhaps related to the nding of Rodrik
(1998) who suggests that more open economies have bigger governments to oset the risk
of terms of trade shocks. Three measures of the age of democracy have intermediate PIPs
(con2150,con81 and mthconst ) which poses the question of whether they enter together
or substitute for each other. Inspection of gure 4.3 which displays the composition of each
model shows that they tend to enter models together. In fact, there would seem to be,
broadly speaking, two likely types of model. The rst, is similar to Model 2 in Table 2 and
contains no age variables. The second type is similar to Models 1, 3, 4, and 5, which contain
measures of democratic age in dierent combinations.21 Furthermore, the main results are
robust to the exclusion of all of the age-of-democracy variables from the analysis.
Rodrik (1999) nds that income per capita, is a signicant determinant of the labor share.
To facillitate comparison with his estimates, and anticipating the next-section where data-
availability obliges using income per-capita as a proxy for productivity in the dynamic-panel
estimates, estimates using (log) income per capita, denoted logyl, were obtained. Recall, that
the model predicts that income per capita y is increasing in productivity . In the interests
of parsimony we do not report the full results. However, they are even stronger in this case:
the PIP of the Pres remains above 99% and the PIP of logyl rises to a similar gure, with
a coecient of around 0.08, suggesting a one standard deviation increase in income per
capita leads to a similar increase in the labor share. The results are otherwise largely similar,
although the PIP of ilat01 falls by nearly 0:5.
Table 3 reports BMA results including the measures of legal origin common, french,
scandi and social taken from Botero et al. (2004). These results are reported separately
because only 47 observations are available for all of the relevant variables. The results are
21Blue/Darker Grey indicates a negative coecient
27Models selected by BMA
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Figure 3: Models Chosen By BMA analysis
largely unchanged, but scandi has a high PIP of 0:68 and a positive coecient. We don't
explore here why this might be, but it is notable that there are no presidential democracies
that use Scandanavian based law. We do not argue here that the low PIPs of the other
legal origin variables cast doubt on Botero et al. (2004)'s ndings, rather that if anything,
one inference is that the determinants of labor regulation and the labor share are dierent.
Outliers are a problem that can aect cross-country analyses, as discussed by Temple
(1998). Standard post-estimation methods of outlier identication, such as DFITS, are not
compatible with the Bayesian approach. Instead, the two-stage estimation method combining
outlier detection and BMA proposed by Hoeting et al. (1996) is used here. First, possible
outliers are identied by the robust estimator Least Trimmed Squares (LTS) as developed
by Rousseeuw (1984). Secondly, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm is used
to estimate the posterior distribution of models. However, unlike the earlier BMA analysis,
28it estimates (6) and simultaneously the posterior distribution of the outliers identied by
the LTS estimation.22 The results of this estimation method are contained in Table 4. The
results conrm that pres has a PIP of just under 100%, but also suggest Honduras and
Ireland are outliers with 81% and 58% probability respectively. Posterior expected values are
not available, but the OLS results in Table 5 discussed below suggest that the signs of the
coecients are unchanged, with the coecient on pres slightly larger at around 14%. Despite
its relative high PIP of 68% loga only appears in two of the ve most likely models, although
the cumulative posterior model probability of these ve is not large. Again, variables seem
to be entering jointly, with a parsimonious models in columns 1,2, and 4, and larger models
in the other two columns. The parsimonious model is similar to that identied above for the
BMA estimates, although the larger model includes dierent controls. For the smaller model,
the PIPs of frankrom and ilat01 are reversed, but otherwise the models are similar. In the
larger models, the eect of democratic age is now largely being captured by con2150, and
a good model is more likely to contain africa and coluka. Equivalent results, not reported,
suggest that the alternative model including the legal origin variables is also outlier robust.23
OLS estimates of the most likely models identied in the BMA and MC3 analyses with
(HC3) robust standard errors are reported in Table 6. Again pres has an estimated coecient
of around  0:12 and is signicant at the 1% level. However, some caution is necessary
when interpreting these results, since when estimating a model identied through extensive
model selection, conventional t-ratios, (as discussed by Miller (2002) and Malik and Temple
(2009)), are generally biased away from zero. The coecients are slightly dierent as there
are slightly more observations available for the specic models reported than there are for
the overall Model Space.24 But, taken as a whole the BMA, MC3 and OLS results all point
22The BMA was performed using code written in `R'. The particular package used, bicreg, was Ian
S. Painter's translation from the S+ code by Adrian Raftery and revised by Chris Volinsky. The MC3
estimates were arrived at using Ian S. Painter's translation of Jennifer Hoeting's S+ code. More precisely,
the BMA estimates were obtained considering all models that at most were 100 times less likely than the
model identied as most likely. The hyperparameters used for the MC3 estimation were those recommended
in Hoeting, Raftery and Madigan (1996).
23A variety of other robustness tests were also performed. The results are as expected given the close to
zero PIP of the constitutional variables other than pres. Tests included using the original variables describing
constitutional form rather than those derived from the principal components analysis, using binary variable
versions of the principal components, principal components derived from subsets of the constitutional variables,
and including a wide range of interaction terms involvingage, polityiv and the constitutional variables.
24BMA requires the same observations to be available for every possible specication, and there are
29in the same direction: presidential democracies pay signicantly lower wages. Moreover,
since BMA helps to circumvent traditional issues concerning model uncertainty, there is
little to suggest that the main nding is not unusually robust.
5 Dynamic Estimates
Whilst, the empirical evidence supports the central prediction of our model - that presidential
democracies lead ceteris paribus to lower wage rates - it is worthwhile assessing whether the
evidence also supports the mechanism that gives rise to this prediction. A central prediction
of the model is that the labor share and average taxation are positively related. Moreover, as
is discussed in Section 2, we expect the level of taxation to be increasing in the productivity
level  in our framework. As such, one test of our model is whether the tax rate, wages, and
productivity are indeed all positively related. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge only
a time-series data on TFP is only available from the mid-1980s. As such we use data on income
per capita, since the model, the results of the previous section and standard economic intuition
suggest they will be related. However, to verify this, a regression was run of GDP/capita
growth (logylit) on TFP growth (logait) as well as country and year xed eects. As
expected, the results suggest a close correspondence between logyl and loga.25 Using cross-
sectional time series data on central government revenue (cgrev), the labor share of income
(labshare) as well as income per capita (yp), we nd evidence that this is indeed the case.
The presentation of the methodology employed will be necessarily brief here, however it is
important to note two key econometric issues. Given the dierent historical experiences of the
countries in the sample, it is reasonable to expect cross-sectional variation in the relationship
between taxation, the labor share, and income. Moreover, there may be cross-sectional
correlation between observations within a given period either due to the impact of a common
shock, or interdependence between countries. To ameliorate such concerns, the data were
fewer observations for the variables g1,...,g4.
25These data are dierent to those used in Section 4.2 and are taken from the (Groningen Growth
Development Centre (2010)) Database. The precise regression run was
logylit = i + logait + t + "it
.
30transformed such that each country-year observation is now expressed as deviations from
the cross-country annual mean.
Panel tests for Unit Roots were conducted on these demeaned data, and the results are
reported in Table 6. As is common for short time-series, these tests, which often lack power,
are not altogether conclusive.26 The Im-Pesaran-Shin tests and the ADF-Fisher tests both
test the null-hypothesis of individual unit-roots. The tests suggest that we are unable to reject
the null for yp and narrowly labsharethe labor share. We fail to nd evidence for a unit root of
cgrev. For all three series we reject the null after dierencing the data. Two tests of alternative
null-hypotheses were employed, the Breitung test, and the Hadri test. However these are only
technically suitable for balanced-panels, whereas our data are unbalanced. As such, whilst
the tests are reported, their interpretation merits great caution. The Breitung test suggests
we can not reject the null of a common-unit root for all three variables. We are able to
reject the null for the rst-dierence of labshare and cgrev, but not for yp. We disregard this
result as an artefact given that we are not aware of any other results in the wider literature
that concur with the result that the rst dierence of income per capita is non-stationary.
Finally, we perform a Hadri test, which tests the alternative null-hypothesis of stationarity,
whilst rejecting stationarity for the level data, it also rejects it for the dierenced data. This
would seem suprising, however Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) argue based on a Monte-Carlo
study that this test often lacks power, and we interpret these results as a consequence of
this and our misapplication of the tests to a non-balanced panel. Our interpretation of the
test results is that they suggest it is prudent to use dierenced data.
The cointegration tests reported in the bottom part of Table 6 are less ambiguous. The
results of the Pedroni (1999, 2004) test suggest that we can reject the null of no cointegration.
In sum, the tests suggest that the variables are both integrated and cointegrated. As such
we use rst dierences of the variables and specify the following error-correction model. The
specication allows for cross-country heterogeneity in the time-series behavior of the data
allowing country specic slope coecients
26For an excellent discussion of the tests used, see Banerjee and Wagner (2009) and references therein.
31labshareit   i(labsharei;t 1   0i   1icgrevit   2iypit)
+ilabsharei;t 1 + icgrevi;t 1 + ypit
+i1tradeit + 2ioilit + it
However, a Hausman test suggests that we are unable to reject the hypothesis that
the there is no systematic variation in i. That is, we are unable to reject the hypothesis
of a consistent cross-country long-run equilibrium. Under the assumption of long-run
homogeneity, the Pooled-Mean-Group estimator proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)
is our preferred estimator. It constrains the long-run error-correction parameters to be equal
across countries, but allows for cross-country variation in the short run variables and the
error correction term, and is both ecient and consistent in the case of homogeneity in the
error correction terms. In the context of the above model, this implies that i =  for all
i, and the estimates reported are for the following model:
labshareit  i(labsharet 1   1cgrevit   2ypit)
+ilabsharei;t 1 + icgrevi;t 1 + ypit
+i1tradeit + 2ioilit + it
The results are presented in Table 7. The evidence supports the hypothesis of a long-run
relationship between the labor share and taxation. The coecient on cgrev, 1 in the previous
equation, is positive and signicant at the one percent level. The reported short-run coecient
estimates are the average of the coecients obtained for each country. There would seem to be
little evidence for any short-run relationship between the labor share, taxation or income, al-
though an increase in the share of trade in GDP is associated with a decrease in the labor share.
One further test of the relationship between taxation and the labor share, and hence
presidentialism and the labor share was conducted. Columns 2 and 3 report PMG estimates
32for sub-samples for presidential and non-presidential systems respectively. If, contrary to the
BMA results, some ommited factor were driving the results we would expect dierent estimated
relationships between taxation, income, and the labor share. Of course, that we do does not
conrm our theory, but is considered to be supportive both of the mechanism described by the
model, and the overall eect of presidential democracies on wages. As if mechanism driving
our result were dierent to what we postulate, then we might expect to observe qualitatively
dierent relationships between the variables, in dierent systems.27 As discussed above,
ideally we would observe random transitions between types of democratic systems so to easily
identify the causal eect of presidential system on taxation and the labor share. However, we
observe few changes in the form of democracy, and these changes are unlikely to be random.
Hence, our empirical strategy has been rst, to identify a causal eect of the type of democracy
given an assumption of selection on observables, and then to conrm the second prediction
of the model that dierences in the labor share should be in part due to dierences in income
and taxation levels. Taken together, we argue that the evidence suggests that presidential
democracies pay lower wages, and that this is because of, all else equal, lower levels of taxation.
6 Conclusions
This paper has argued that presidential democracies are associated with lower wages because
in equilibrium there are lower levels of taxation. In particular it employs a variant of the
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1998) model with costly taxation, situated in a simple
macroeconomic framework to generate these predictions. These predictions were then tested
using Bayesian Model Averaging to estimate the treatment eect on the labor share of
income associated with Presidential as opposed to Parliamentary democracies. Furthermore,
evidence that these dierences are indeed due to dierences in taxation is provided by results
obtained using Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)'s Pooled-Mean-Group estimator. However,
it would be foolhardy to claim too much on the basis of these results. In particular the
eect estimated is the average treatment eect, and does not consider possible heterogeneity.
27Results were also obtained using data explicitly describing revenues from dierent sources of taxation,
business, personal, etc. However, these data are only available for some of the OECD and only one
presidential democracy (the USA) although the same positive relationship was identied.
33Moreover, no welfare analysis is attempted of whether voters are better of with high wages,
high taxes, high levels of public goods, and high levels of wastage, or vice-versa. There are
also several limitations to our approach, in particular, ideally there would be improved data
on the labor share available for a large cross-section of countries, and similarly data on tax
revenues for non-OECD countries. However, whilst improved data might make for more
precise inferences, we do not believe that the overall result is likely to be aected.
Table 1: Summary Statistics - BMA Variables
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
mean9094 72 0:366 0:138 0:102 0:664
pres 85 0:388 0:490 0:000 1:000
g1 75 0:000 1:886  1:880 2:778
g2 75 0:000 1:024  0:678 4:142
g3 75 0:000 0:497  1:509 1:361
g4 75 0:000 0:336  0:948 1:217
g5 75 0:000 0:187  0:700 0:338
federal 83 0:157 0:366 0:000 1:000
logyl 84 9:176 0:881 6:954 10:476
ilat01 85 30:747 18:456 1:218 67:470
age 85 0:208 0:219 0:030 1:000
mthconst 85 0:542 0:569 0:035 2:577
mthelect 85 0:509 0:479 0:044 2:074
con2150 85 0:106 0:310 0:000 1:000
con5180 85 0:294 0:458 0:000 1:000
con81 85 0:494 0:503 0:000 1:000
coluka 85 0:282 0:393 0:000 0:928
africa 85 0:129 0:338 0:000 1:000
asiae 85 0:153 0:362 0:000 1:000
laam 85 0:271 0:447 0:000 1:000
frankrom 78 2:866 0:840 0:940 5:639
engfrac 78 0:138 0:318 0:000 1:000
eurfrac 78 0:398 0:437 0:000 1:004
common 59 0:339 0:477 0:000 1:000
social 59 0:153 0:363 0:000 1:000
french 59 0:356 0:483 0:000 1:000
german 59 0:085 0:281 0:000 1:000
scandi 59 0:068 0:254 0:000 1:000




















Intercept 1  0:074 0:304 0:200  0:370  0:133 0:245 0:199
pres 0:998  0:120 0:037  0:106  0:100  0:099  0:142  0:112
frankrom 0:964 0:043 0:017 0:044 0:041 0:045 0:048 0:046
loga 0:607 0:037 0:037 0:071 0:042
ilat01 0:521 0:001 0:001 0:003 0:002 0:002 0:002
mthconst 0:51 0:031 0:037 0:071 0:044
con2150 0:323 0:023 0:040
africa 0:296 0:024 0:044 0:085
con81 0:246 0:016 0:032
con5180 0:095  0:004 0:017
coluka 0:089 0:005 0:022
asiae 0:073  0:005 0:020
mthelect 0:034 0:002 0:011
age 0:028 0:003 0:019
engfrac 0:027  0:002 0:013
laam 0:027  0:002 0:012
g4 0:015 0:000 0:005
federal 0:015  0:001 0:007
eurfrac 0:014  0:001 0:007
g2 0:004 0:000 0:001
g1 0:001 0:000 0:000
g3 0 0:000 0:000
R2 0:57 0:623 0:596 0:565 0:593
BIC  39:150  38:992  38:777  38:453  38:361
The dependent variable is the mean of the labor share of value-added in manufacturing in the period
1990-1994. The variables are sorted by their posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs): the sum of the posterior
probabilities of those models which include that variable. The posterior expected value is the weighted
average of the expected value in each model, weighting using the Posterior Model Probability (PMP) of
each model. The posterior standard deviation is calculated using the same approach but using the standard
deviations in each model. Models 1-5 are the 5 most likely models as assessed by their PMPs, and describe
the variables included in those models and their coecients. The variables g1-g5 are derived from a principal
components analysis of the ve measures of constitutional type:- maj, magn, pind, sdm, and spropn.
35Table 3: Results Including Botero et al (2004) Legal Origin




















Intercept 1:000  0:145 0:305  0:386 0.200  0:159 0:198  0:370
pres 0:999  0:127 0:033  0:137 -0.106  0:136  0:146  0:100
frankrom 0:984 0:043 0:016 0:043 0.044 0:047 0:047 0:041
loga 0:716 0:045 0:037 0:072 0:044 0:071
scandi 0:679 0:073 0:064 0:105 0:104 0:103
mthconst 0:588 0:036 0:036 0:057 0:059 0:076
con2150 0:512 0:041 0:048 0:084 0:079 0:086
con81 0:502 0:040 0:046 0:076 0:079 0:069
africa 0:347 0:028 0:046 0:082 0:085
ilat01 0:225 0:000 0:001 0.003 0:002
con5180 0:096 0:000 0:018
coluka 0:089 0:005 0:019
asiae 0:087  0:005 0:020
age 0:074 0:008 0:037
laam 0:036  0:002 0:013
g5 0:032 0:002 0:016
mthelect 0:026 0:001 0:010
g1 0:015 0:000 0:001
g4 0:013 0:000 0:004
common 0:011 0:000 0:005
federal 0:007 0:000 0:004
german 0:007 0:000 0:004
engfrac 0:006 0:000 0:007
g2 0:000 0:000 0:000
g3 0:000 0:000 0:000
eurfrac 0:000 0:000 0:000
french 0:000 0:000 0:000
R2 0:697 0.570 0:672 0:648 0:623
BIC  39:967 -39.150  39:141  39:016  38:992
As for Table 2.














loga 0:680 X X







ilat01 0:823 X X X X X
engfrac 0:043
eurfrac 0:043
frankrom 0:633 X X X X
mthconst 0:267
mthelect 0:058
coluka 0:542 X X
africa 0:366 X X
laam 0:064
asiae 0:099
con2150 0:586 X X X
con5180 0:064
con81 0:142
Possible Outliers Posterior Probability of being an outlier
Ireland 0:811 X X X X









Posterior Model Probability 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008
The dependent variable is the mean of the labor share of value-added in manufacturing in the period
1990-1994. Estimates obtained using the MC3 estimator. The variables are sorted by their posterior
inclusion probabilities (PIPs): the sum of the posterior probabilities of those models which include that
variable. Models 1-5 are the 5 most likely models as assessed by their PMPs, and describe the variables
included, and observations identied as outliers, in those models.
37Table 5: OLS Estimates of the models identied by
BMA/MC3 as being most likely
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pres  0:106  0:098  0:150  0:128  0:106  0:163
(0:028) (0:029) (0:029) (0:033) (0:028) (0:029)
frankrom 0:043 0:039 0:014 0:018 0:043
(0:013) (0:015) (0:022) (0:021) (0:013)
ilat01 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:003
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
loga 0:063 0:066 0:089
(0:022) (0:028) (0:026)












Constant 0:201  0:303  0:265 0:262 0:201  0:325
(0:055) (0:195) (0:242) (0:072) (0:055) (0:226)
R2 0:553 0:621 0:712 0:568 0:553 0:615
N 70 65 49 51 70 63
Huber-White (HC3) Robust Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Columns 1 and 2 correspond to Models 1 and 2 in Table 2. Columns 3 and 4 similarly correspond to Models
1 and 2 in Table 3, and Columns 5 and 6, correspond to the Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 with the 6th column
excluding observations for Honduras and Ireland, that were identied as outliers by the MC3 algorithm.




H0: Individual Unit Roots
Im-Pesaran-Shin
Level -1.514 0:065  3:222 0:001 9:135 1:000
First Dierence -20.516 0:000  19:371 0:000  11:934 0:000
ADF-Fisher
Level -1.537 0:062  3:250 0:001 8:406 1:000
First Dierence -17.750 0:000  17:514 0:000  10:312 0:000
H0: Common Unit Root
Breitung
Level 3.165 0:999 2:181 0:985 12:310 1:000
First Dierence -8.505 0:000  8:003 0:000 5:697 1:000
H0: No Unit Root
Hadri
Level 9.382 0:000 7:875 0:000 15:590 0:000
First Dierence 5.447 0:000 4:725 0:000 5:483 0:000
Cointegration Tests
H0: No Cointegration
Pedroni Panel ADF -3.298 0:000
Pedroni Group ADF -2.645 0:004
All tests conducted using automatic lag-order selction, and individual intercepts, but no individual trends
(except the Breitung test which has both). ADF-Fisher test statistics are the Choi Z-statistic.
39Table 7: Pooled Mean Group Estimates of Dynamic Model




cgrevt   cgrevt 0:008 0:006 0:002
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
ypt   ypt 0:006 0:017 0:010
(0:002) (0:006) (0:002)
 i  0:259  0:221  0:312
(0:038) (0:076) (0:050)
(labshareit 1   labsharet 1) 0:019 0:048 0:022
(0:038) (0:065) (0:043)
(cgrevit 1   cgrevt 1) 0:000  0:000 0:001
(0:001) (0:002) (0:002)
(ypit 1   ypt 1)  0:017  0:037  0:011
(0:012) (0:030) (0:009)
(tradeit 1   tradet 1)  0:002  0:002  0:002
(0:000) (0:001) (0:001)
(oilit 1   oilt 1) 0:001 0:003 0:000
(0:003) (0:005) (0:003)
Constant  0:002  0:023 0:022
(0:006) (0:009) (0:007)
N 1029 353 676
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are obtained using the Pooled Mean Group estimator
of Pesaran et al. (1999).   is the Short-Run Error Correction Term. (p < 0:10), (p < 0:05), (p < 0:01)
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